his mixture of archaic attachments to cultural traditions that
nonetheless aspire to the technological and scientific modernity
characterising the contemporary subjective cocktail.
Traditional psychoanalysis, for its part, is hardly better placed
to confront these problems, due to its habit of reducing social
facts to psychological mechanisms. In such conditions it
appears opportune to forge a more transversalist conception of
subjectivity, one which would permit us to understand both its
idiosyncratic territorialised couplings (Existential Territories)
and its opening onto value systems (Incorporeal Universes)
with their social and cultural implications.
Should we keep the semiotic productions of the mass media,
informatics, telematics and robotics separate from psychological
subjectivity? I don't think so. Just as social machines can be
grouped under the general title of Collective Equipment, technological
machines of information and communication operate at
the heart ofhuman subjectivity, not only within its memory and
intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious
fantasms. Recognition ofthese machinic dimensions of subjectivation
leads us to insist, in our attempt at redefinition, on the
heterogeneity of the components leading to the production of
subjectivity. Thus one finds in it: 1. Signifying semiological components
which appear in the family, education, the environment,
religion, art, sport ... 2. Elements constructed by the
media industry, the cinema, etc., 3. A-signifying semiological
dimensions that trigger informational sign machines, and that
function in parallel or independently of the fact that they pro:.
duce and convey significations and denotations, and thus
escape from strictly linguistic axiomatics. The different currents
of structuralism have given neither aUtonomy nor specificity to
this a-signifying regime, although authors like Julia Kristeva or
Jacques Derrida have shed some light on the relative autonomy
of this sort of component.