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Libyan Intelligence Service activity in the UK

The Security Service is also known as MI5. »xxxx« indicates text censored by hand. »Cropped« means during copying, not by censoring.


[14 pages.]


TEL: 0171-828 8688 EXT: 88300
GTN: 3033
FAX: 0171-630 1428

Our Ref: PF690551/G9/0

Date: 1 December 1995

Dear xxxxxxxxx

Libyan Intelligence Service activity in the UK

Since his arrival as Head of the Libyan Interests Section
in London in July 1993, we have been monitoring the activities
of Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA. We have concluded that he is actively
engaged in carrying out tasks on behalf of the Libyan
Intelligence Service (LIS).

2. In parallel to our investigation SIS and more recently,
ourselves have cultivated BAZELYA as a potential source of
intelligence. Although BAZELYA has provided some low-grade
intelligence, we assess that his first loyalty remains to the
Libyan regime. We consider the balance of advantage to lie
in ending BAZELYA's hostile intelligence activities. We propose
that he be declared Persona Non Grata in the immediate future.

3. Exact timing is of course a matter for your consideration.
You will be aware of the overtures made through one of our
sources by xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx regarding the delivery of the
Lockerbie suspects into UK jurisdiction. This was discussed
on 28 November at a meeting between xxxxxxxxxx (G9)and xxxxx
xxxxxxxxx (G6), and xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (DICTD) and xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxx (NENAD). We assess that the expulsion of BAZELYA will not
have serious repercussions for our source.

4. I attach a written case against BAZELYA. It was discussed
with xxxxxxxxxxxxxx of NENAD on 17 November. xxxxxxxxxx invited
submission in a telephone conversation we had on 28 November.


Envelope for return [balance of boxed notation cropped]




5. With regard to the murder of Libyan dissident Al Mehmet
ABU SAID in London on 26 November, we have no reliable
intelligence implicating BEZELYA. However, intelligence on
a possible lead to Libyan regime involvement has been received
and is being assessed. We will report further in due course
although we do not believe that it would add to our submission
on this matter.

6. Please contact me if there are any aspects of this proposal
which you may wish to discuss.

Yours ever [by hand]

xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx [signature]

Pxxxxx [Name or title]



Copied to:

xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx
FCO FCO Home Office




Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA

Head of Libyan Interests Section, London
Cooptee of Libyan Intelligence Service


We recommend that Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA, head
of Libyan Interests Section in London, be declared Persona
Non Grata for engaging in activity incompatible with his
diplomatic status which we believe poses a direct threat
to the national security of the United Kingdom.


2. Our investigation of BAZELYA's activities since his

[balance of page cropped.]



g. BAZELYA may be involved in a project to establish
a Libyan Scientific Centre which will be used
as cover for technology transfer to Libya.

Background – Career Prior to Current Appointment

3. BAZELYA took up his appointment as replacement for
Ahmad Omar AMEISH, Head of the Libyan Interests Section
(LIS) London, on 1st July 1993. he is one of two Libyan
diplomats currently en poste in the UK. According to
a reliable FBI source, BAZELYA was not the Libyan MFA
choice for the post. It was therefore assumed that he
had obtained the post through patronage or intelligence
connections or function. We later received collateral
for this in October 1993. According to a reliable SIS
source BAZELYA admitted that QADHAFI and BAZELYA's other
intelligence patrons secured his appointment to London.

4. BAZELYA had previously been en poste in this country
as cultural attache and then press attache between 1974-
1979, when he was responsible for liaison with Libyan
backed extremist groups in the UK. We suspected he had
an intelligence function, though this assessment was based
mainly on BAZELYA's contacts rather than his actions.
However, a reliable SIS source reported that he was one
of QADHAFI's agents in the UK. Another source of unknown
reliability reported having seen a revolver in the glove
compartment of BAZELYA's car.

5. Separate sources reported that during this period
BAZELYA had links with Sinn Fein in the Republic of
Ireland. In January 1992 the FBI reported it had reliable
source information linking BAZELYA with PIRA, although
we have no further details or the date of the information.
BAZELYA certainly visited Dublin on a number of occasions
and was in contact with a number of Irish nationals.
He was also in regular contact with the Irish-Arab Society
in Dublin, then suspected of having close links to PIRA.
An SIS source whose reliability is currently being
reassessed, also reported BAZELYA's numerous Irish contacts
and said BAZELYA had a bank account at Dublin airport.
On one occasion the source was given a checque drawn on
this account.

6. BAZELYA was posted to Addis Ababa in March 1981.
Separate sources have reported that during his 11 year
tour he was heavily involved in activities on behalf of
Libyan intelligence. These activities resulted in the
expulsion of BAZELYA and another Libyan official from
Ethiopia in March 1991. A CIA source of unestablished




reliability reported that they were expelled for meeting
anti-government rebel groups including the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front and providing them with
unspecified assistance. This supports earlier intelligence
from a Kenyan liaison service. In 1985 it reported that
BAZELYA was thought to play a major role in channelling
Libyan funds to Libyan backed African groups.

7. Further collateral for this was provided recently
by a reliable source, delicate and well-placed Security Service
source, who reported that for several years BAZELYA
provided munitions to the Muslim-backed Eritrean Liberation
Front. Some of these munitions reportedly may have been
used to assassinate an Ethiopian minister during the
Ethiopian civil war. According to source, weapons were
smuggled in the Libyan diplomatic bag via Libyan Arab
Airlines flights and BAZELYA was expelled after one of
these consignments was intercepted by the Ethiopian

8. The same source has also reported that in 1984 the
Revolutionary Committee in Libya, of which BAZELYA was
a prominent member, was directly responsible for ordering
the hanging of 13 anti-regime student activists at Al
Fatah University in Tripoli.

Attempts to Recruit BAZELYA

9. BAZELYA has been a long standing target for
recruitment by SIS and more recently the Security Service.
Prior to his arrival in the UK in 1993 he had significant
intelligence traces. However, he was granted a visa to
come to the UK as it was assessed at the time that the
potential intelligence dividends of recruiting him
outweighed the likely threat he would pose to the security
of the UK. Since then we have received further adverse
information about BAZELYA's activities before he came
to the UK. Although his cultivation has continued he had
not provided intelligence of value and has continued to
work against UK interests.

Activities During Current Appointment

Security Service Sources

10. Reporting from several sources has enabled us to
build up a detailed picture of BAZELYA's activities in
London. Much of our information comes from reliable,
delicate and well-placed sources within the LIS (source 1),
the revolutionary student community (source 2) and the




Libyan dissident community (source 3), who are in close
contact with BAZELYA. Other Security Service sources,
telephone intercept, surveillance, SIS sources, and liaison
sources have provided substantial additional intelligence
and collateral for these agents' reporting.

BAZELYA's contacts within the Libyan Regime

11. Since his arrival in the UK BAZELYA has been in
frequent contact with senior members of the Libyan regime,
including the Libyan intelligence services. The most
significant of these are:

a) MUSA KUSA: KUSA is the head of the Libyan External
Security Organization (ESO), the principal
intelligence institution in Libya which has been
responsible for supporting terrorist organizations
and for perpetrating state sponsored acts of
terrorism. He is also the head of Al Mathaba, the
Libyan centre for anti-imperialist propaganda which
has funded third world guerilla groups. KUSA is
wanted by the French authorities for questioning
about the UTA 772 bombing.

According to CX report 93/35282, KUSA was instrumental
in securing BAZELYA his posting to London. Their
relationship is long-standing and close. Separate
sources have commented that BAZELYA is KUSA's »puppet«
or »right hand man«. According to source 1,
BAZELYA's loyalty to KUSA is unquestioned; BAZELYA
considers KUSA the only person he can trust.

The two are in frequent telephone contact. Telephone
intercept on the LIS (telecheck) has indicated that
on his trips back to Libya, BAZELYA visits KUSA at
ESO headquarters and regularly receives and carries
out instructions from KUSA. For example, in October
1995 telecheck and source 1 reported that BAZELYA
was initially unhappy about extending the student
status of Muhammad WARRAD, a hardline revolutionary
student suspected of having links with PIRA during
the 1980s. However, BAZELYA quickly changed his mind
on the receipt of a fax from KUSA ordering WARRAD's
studentship to continue. Similarly, BAZELYA, though
not happy with the arrangement, is obeying KUSA's
instructions to subsidise another revolutionary
student, Muhammad MARWAN, a suspected Libyan
intelligence officer, out of LIS funds to enable
him to stay in the UK.

TOP [Balance cropped.]



b) Muhammad NIAMA @ NAAMA: NIAMA is the ESO's General
Secretary. Telecheck has revealed that BAZELYA is
in regular contact with him, most notably in April
1995 when BAZELYA informed NIAMA that he had arranged
for some papers to be faxed to KUSA at the ESO from
a third country rather than from the UK. BAZELYA
tasked Isa BARUNI, financial attache at the LIS.
to fax the documents from Turkey, and instructed
him to destroy them after faxing them.

12. According to an SIS source of unknown reliability,
BAZELYA knows QADHAFI personally and has hosted him at
his home in Libya. In October 1993 a reliable SIS source
reported that BAZELYA had powerful patrons in Libya; in
addition to KUSA these were Abdullah SENUSSI and Abdusalem
SADMA, who at the time were de facto head and deputy head
of the ESO.

13. BAZELYA is in telephone contact with other members
of Libyan intelligence, including Khaled MABRUK, and ESO
official close to KUSA. In July 1995 Mustafa ZAIDI, and
IO with a history of violence in Europe, tried to contact
BAZELYA at the LIS and left a number where BAZELYA could
reach him. At the time ZAIDI was trying to come to the
UK reportedly to co-ordinate Libyan regime activity against
dissidents. ZAIDI was refused a UK visa.

BAZELYA's Agent-Running Activities

14. Separate sources continue to report that the Libyan
regime has increased its monitoring of Libyan dissidents
and oppositionists abroad. This is largely a reaction
to an aborted coup in 1993 which QADHAFI believes was
orchestrated by oppositionists abroad. BAZELYA is actively
involved in this monitoring. He runs a network of agents
in the UK who report to him on the dissident and
oppositionist communities. According to source 1, BAZELYA
pays these agents £500-800 per agent per month form a
»political« budget which is virtually limitless and
unaccountable. The ESO in Tripoli simply requires regular
intelligence reports and statements of how many
agents/informants BAZELYA is running. We are aware of
four agents.

a) Mohammad Abdelhakim DIAB: DIAB is a UK based Egyptian

[balance of page cropped.]



by BAZELYA on the latter's return to the UK in 1993.
DIAB reports on dissidents, including Syrians,
Egyptians and Libyans. In January 1995 telecheck
reported that BAZELYA arranged to visit KUSA with
DIAB. KUSA was keen to see DIAB and believed he
might be »useful«.

b) Wasfi BIN ISSA: BIN ISSA is a UK-based Libyan
businessman. Source 1 has reported that he was on
the locally engaged staff at the Libyan Embassy in
1970s and knew BAZELYA. In April 1990 a reliable
and well placed dissident source, reported that BIN
ISSA was initially approached by Abdusalem ZADMA,
then the de facto deputy head of the ESO and tasked
with gathering information on dissidents. Telecheck
has confirmed that BIN ISSA is in contact with BAZELYA
and regularly arranges to meet him. I has also
reported that BIN ISSA is known to KUSA and has
visited him in Libya. BIN ISSA reportedly receives
between £500-£700 per month from BAZELYA for his
weekly reports on dissident activity.

c) Nasr/Abdelnasser ABDRABAH @ AL ANAIZI: Nasr is a
veteran of the Afghan war. In April 1994 telecheck
revealed that Nasr volunteered to pass BAZELYA
information on dissidents. Telecheck and surveillance
have established that the two now meet and speak
regularly. Nasr seems to have unusually good access
to BAZELYA. Telecheck has indicated that Nasr
regularly rings BAZELYA at home and on his mobile
telephone and while BAZELYA was abroad recently Nasr
made concerted efforts to contact him.

In September 1995 Nasr passed information to BAZELYA
by telephone about the identities of Muslim
Fundamentalists involved in disturbances in Benghazi,
who had been arrested by Sudanese security. One
individual was resident in the UK. Nasr stated he
had further information to impart when he met BAZELYA
face to face. BAZELYA agreed to pay Nasr for his
information. On another occasion BAZELYA advised
Nasry that it would be better to speak face to face
rather than by telephone. All this strongly indicates
that this is a covert relationship between an
intelligence officer and an agent.

d) Abdelqader BRIFKANI: BRIFKANI is an Iraqi Kurd who
has been in regular contact with BAZELYA since at
least January 1994. He is also a contact of
Abdelhakim DIAB. Source 1 has reported that BRIFKANI




has visited Libya on several occasions. Telecheck
has provided collateral for this and has indicated
that BAZELYA has assisted BRIFKANI with his travel
arrangements on at least two occasions, in January
1994 and January 1995. Source 1 has stated that
BRIFKANI is a »paid agent of BAZELYA« and reports
on the activities of the Libyan opposition in the

15. BAZELYA has attempted to recruit at least one other
agent. In February 1995 source3, a reliable dissident
source, reported that BAZELYA tried to recruit him that
month to report on Libyan royalist groups in the UK and
Europe who oppose the regime. BAZELYA told source he
was interested in behind-the-scenes grass roots activists,
rather than dissident leaders. BAZELYA wanted personal
particulars, details of travel overseas, opposition groups'
printing locations and general modus operandi. BAZELYA
implied that he would pay the source for his services.
The source declined the offer.

16. In January 1995, telecheck reported that BAZELYA
had targeted someone he considered suitable to work for
KUSA in the Sudan. This person was prepared to form a
group to serve KUSA. BAZELYA implied that the person's
suitability was enhanced by the fact that he was not known
to other intelligence services. KUSA instructed BAZELYA
to make appropriate arrangements and inform him of the
details at a face to face meeting.

BAZELYA's Alleged Threats to Dissidents

17. In February 1995 source 3 reported that, following
his refusal to become one of BAZELYA's informants (see
para 15 above), BAZELYA threatened him. The threat was
reported to the police and BAZELYA was interviewed by
the Diplomatic Protection Group on 16 February 1995.
No further action was taken.

18. Also in February 1995 source 3 reported that Dr Salem
Omar ISSA was threatened by BAZELYA at the LIS. When
interviewed by the Security Service ISSA himself confirmed
that he was subjected to harassment, though he stated
that it was more of a stern warning than a threat.
Nevertheless he took it very seriously. Source 3 later
reported that ISSA told him that he had played down the
harassment during the interview, out of fear that BAZELYA
might somehow learn of his complaint.




19. In April 1995 source 3 reported that a (fnu) IZZ
AL-DEN had received money from BAZELYA as a sweetner
after being harassed by BAZELYA. However, we have no
collateral for this.

BAZELYA's Contact with Suspected Libyan Intelligence
Officers in the UK

20. Reliable reporting from agents and telecheck indicates
that there are at least four Libyan intelligence officers
(IOs) in the UK under student cover. Our intelligence
suggests they are working to a ESO brief.

21. We would expect that legitimate students would deal
directly with the financial attache, not with BAZELYA.
However, source 1 has reported that the intelligence
officers meet BAZELYA privately at teh LIS to report on
the Libyan dissident and student communities in the UK.
Source 2 has provided collateral for this and telecheck
has confirmed their direct contact with BAZELYA. Source 1
has reported that these IOs also have direct links with
Musa KUSA and send their reports to him via DHL courier
service. These are reportedly entrusted to BAZELYA who
personally oversees their ownward transmission to KUSA.
The principal figures are:

a) Mohammed MARWAN:

MARWAN is a London based law student. Both
Source 1 and source 2 have reported that he
is a Libyan intelligence officer. According
to source 1, MARWAN is a frequent visitor to
BAZELYA and a close friend of Musa KUSA.
Telecheck and source 2 have provided collateral
for this reporting and has revealed that, during
his fairly frequent trips back to Libya, MARWAN
regularly visits KUSA at ESO offices, and has
acted a messenger between KUSA and BAZELYA.
Source 1 reported that, following a recent trip
to Libya, BAZELYA met MARWAN daily for up to
3 hours at a time to discuss "Musa KUSA

b) Yousef SHAKONA:

SHAKONA is a London based student of
international relations. He has significant
intelligence traces. According to a reliable
Security Service source, he was employed by
the Foreign Ministry Intelligence Section in
Tripoli and was responsible for letter intercept.
Both source 2 and source 1 have reported he




is an IO. Telecheck has confirmed his contact
with BAZELYA and has indicated that BAZELYA
holds him in some regard. Source 1 has reported
that SHAKONA's student grant has expired and
that BAZELYA is helping him to survive with
payments from his »political« budget to pay

c. Bulghasem MASSOUD:

MASSOUD is a Bristol based student whom separate
sources have reported as a Libyan IO employed
by the ESO. MASSOUD has tried to contact BAZELYA
by telephone, and, according to source 1, visits
him at the LIS when in London.

d. Abdelsalem RADWAN @ Abdulsalem MOHAMMAD:

MOHAMMAD is a Colchester-based law student, whom
we assess has an intelligence function. In
August 1993, BAZELYA visited MOHAMMAD at his
Colchester home, one of the few occasions BAZELYA
has travelled outside London. According to
source 1, MOHAMMAD is in a similar position
to SHAKONA, surviving on payments from BAZELYA.

BAZELYA's involvement with the Revolutionary Student
Community in the UK

22. Libyan revolutionary students have in the past been
responsible for violent anti-dissident activity in the
UK and abroad. Since the student expulsions of 1986 there
has been relatively little revolutionary student activity
in the UK and recent reliable reporting has suggested
that the Libyan regime has ordered a reduction in
revolutionary student activity, at least overt activity,
as part of its efforts to improve its image. However,
separate reliable reporting has indicated that the students
themselves wish to reactivate their activities, source 1
has reported that BAZELYA is colluding with the
revolutionary student to help them begin their activities
again. He holds frequent meetings with a hard core of
revolutionary students who form the revolutionary student
committee in the UK, and facilitates revolutionary student
funding by personally arranging for the Libyan MFA to
officially request the financial attache, BARUNI, to
release funds, which BURUNI would otherwise be reluctant
to do.

23. BAZELYA has been involved in setting up a new Libyan
»club« on the Libyan school premises, which will, according
to source 1, be used by the revolutionary students as




a meeting place to coordinate their activities. In May
1995 telecheck reported that BAZELYA advised Muhammad
JIBRIL, leader of the revolutionary students in the UK,
that they should remain in the background during the early
days of the club, implying that they would be able to
exert their influence at a later date. Source 1 has
reported that since the club's opening BAZELYA has begun
to meet the students there rather than at the LIS. After
meeting the students he writes a report for KUSA. We
believe that he has changed the location of his meetings
to try to prevent our coverage of them.

24. In November 1995 source 1 reported that BAZELYA had
put forward a proposal to transfer financial administration
of Libyan students in the UK to an English limited
liability company funded by the Libyan government. A
firm of solicitors has reportedly been engaged to advise
the LIS in this matter. If the proposal goes ahead, we
believe BAZELYA will be able to deny responsibility
for any actions undertaken by Libyan students in the UK.
This could also potentially cause great embarrassment,
as a British company could be held responsible for any
violent or undesirable activity.

Disruption of SIS sources

25. As part of his intelligence brief BAZELYA reports
to Musa KUSA at the ESO. Source 1 recently reported that,
following the Libyan National Day celebrations, BAZELYA
sent a report to KUSA detailing individuals who had not
attended. According to source the favored way of dealing
with miscreants is usually to recall them to Libya where
the individual can be dealt with appropriately, or to
make life difficult for them, for example, by obstructing
travel on business to Libya. The SIS Libyan agent runner,
has pointed out that three of the individuals named are
important SIS sources. He voiced great concern that
BAZELYA's actions may disrupt these sources' reporting
by affecting their ability to travel between the UK and
Libya. HMG therefore stands to lose a great deal of
important political intelligence.

BAZELYA's Possible Involvement in Technology Transfer

26. Source 1 has recently reported that BAZELYA may be
involved in facilitating a Libyan project which has
technology transfer implications. He has had detailed
discussions with Dr Abdul Majid ABDULRAHMAN, a Libyan
researcher in High Energy Physics at the Rutherford
Appleton Laboratory, about the latter's proposal to set
up a Libyan Scientific Centre. The same source has
reported that in May 1995 BAZELYA sent Musa KUSA a letter

[Balance of page, probably only classification, cropped.]



outlining the proposal. KUSA approved teh project. The
draft proposal indicates an implicit intent to use the
centre as cover for technology transfer to Libya, and
to disguise the centre's true purpose by using an
unattributable name. Monitoring of the centre's members
will reportedly be carried out by the revolutionary
students who report directly to KUSA.

BAZELYA's Commercial Activities

27. We are currently investigating BAZELYA's role in
the transfer of Libyan funds through the UK to an unknown
destination. Since 1993 large sums of money, which we
assess originate from Al Mathaba, have passed through
LIS accounts and from BAZELYA's personal account to a
British journalist who has then paid some of the money
to client accounts in the name of Kojo TSIKATA, a Ghanaian
intelligence officer, held with a British firm of
solicitors. Though we are uncertain for what purpose
this money has been paid, the routing of the payments
is highly suspicious, and efforts have been made to
disguise the source. We continue to investigate this

28. BAZELYA has also recently been heavily involved in
promoting a Libyan PR campaign aimed at persuading the
British public that the Libyans were not responsible for
the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. A British
PR and lobbying company, GJW, is to carry out the work.
Telecheck has suggested that BAZELYA intends to take a
huge personal cut from the project's budget. Source 1
has provided collateral fro this, reporting that BAZELYA
would get £1.5 million. We believe that the Libyan
authorities are not aware of this activity which is
incompatible with BAZELYA's diplomatic status (Article
42 of the Vienna Convention).

29. There is some evidence to suggest that BAZELYA has
engaged in further commercial activities for personal
gain, which would also contravene the conditions of his
diplomatic status. For example, in late 1994 telecheck
revealed that he was involved in arranging a deal to buy
Flit insecticide. We assess that it is likely BAZELYA
did secure a profit for himself but there is no firm
evidence to prove this.


30. Over the last year activity on behalf of the Libyan
Intelligence Services, involving the monitoring of Libyan
dissidents and oppositionists in the UK, has increased.
While we assess that, as long as UN sanctions remain in

[Balance of page, probably only classification, cropped.]



place, the Libyan regime is unlikely to attack Western
interests, we view the stepping up of Libyan intelligence
activity with great concern. Though there is at present
no firm evidence that the recent murder of Ali Mehmed
Abu SAID is connected to Libyan Intelligence Services,
we may have to review our assessment. What is clear is
that, should the Libyan regime wish to resume its violent
activities, it has a pool of individuals in the UK, headed
by BAZELYA, who would be willing to participate, and an
established structure for coordinating these activities.

31. BAZELYA is the focal point for Libyan intelligence
activity in the UK and is becoming increasingly active
in his own right. His continued presence in the UK can
only serve to facilitate further intelligence activity.

32. BAZELYA's expulsion would severely disrupt the Libyan
intelligence effort in the UK. It would also send a strong
message to the Libyan regime that HMG will not tolerate
Libyan intelligence activity on British soil.


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